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Abstract 
This paper examines a case of participatory local government budgeting in Japan. The paper 
demonstrates how cultural values interact with stages of the PB process (in our case co-
planning or consultation phase of budgeting). We find three key stakeholders - assembly 
members, officials and citizens – have varying degree of participation in the budget process. 
Whilst direct citizen participation has been limited and challenging, we find local 
associations and assembly members work as lobbyists to influence the budget less publicly. 
This paper makes an important contribution in arguing that wider stakeholders’ engagements 
need to be considered in terms of the particular cultural context. The paper also contributes to 
the broader debate on local government reforms and their translation into varied contexts by 
problematising such a linear adoption of knowledge.  
 
Points for practitioners 
We offer cautions to policy makers for the wholesale adoption of knowledge from one 
context to the other. In the Japanese context, we urge them to draw on the strengths of 
grouping behaviour. Hence, engagement with associations, communities and various interests 
groups must be emphasised instead of simply relying on direct yet remote communications to 
citizens. Political engagements by the departments – perhaps via political parties – can be 
adopted before budget proposals are made to the local authority assembly. This will allow 
more space for the politicians to make their case to citizens, and maintain harmony (wa) 
within and between the political groups. 
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Over the last decade, participatory budgeting1 (hereafter PB) has been one of the most 
widespread reforms undertaken by local governments, with 1,500 PB instances in various 
countries (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). PB in local governments has been subject to scrutiny 
in many countries, mainly in Europe and the USA (Gusmano, 2013; Rossmann and 
Shanahan, 2011). A number of studies have been carried out to explain key stakeholders’ 
engagements (or lack thereof) in the local budgeting process citing both economic and non-
economic reasons, for instance budgetary constraints and perceptions of citizens (Barbera et 
al., 2016). Fewer studies have however examined how the budgetary participation process 
operates and interacts with the local cultural conditions, which may provide deeper 
explanations for why reforms such as PB often produce a variety of unanticipated 
consequences (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Christensen and Fan, 2016).  
PB instances in local government outside Anglo-America and Europe have been 
limited (Kuruppu et al., 2016). Japanese local governments are of particular interest due to 
their relatively recent interest in engaging with wider stakeholders (Tanaka, 2010). Political 
participation has long been in place in Japan through the direct election of Mayors and 
assembly members. This has been further strengthened by the idea of engaging citizens in the 
selection of local priorities  (Sintomer et al., 2012). While some forms of PB are claimed to 
be in place in  a number of Japanese city councils, including Abiko, Siki, Nabari and Osaka-
Sayamatori (JMRC, 2012; Matsuda, 2005; Fukushima, 2014), intensive case studies of PB 
process in Japan is scarce (Masujima, 2005). 
PB, which advocates an Anglo-Saxon attitude toward governance, is likely to raise 
interesting issues given that prevailing social and cultural values in Japan are significantly 
different from those of Western countries (Norton, 2007; Kudo, 2003; Christensen, 2000; Jun 
and Muto, 1995; Eshima et al., 2001). Our Japanese case presents us with an excellent 
opportunity to study and theorise the dynamics of PB processes in a non-Western context. 
Thus, we intend to focus2 on the interactions of stages of PB process and local cultural 
values. 
Empirically, the paper investigates the nature and extent of participation in the 
budgeting process of a Japanese local government – Kitakyushu Council – frequently cited 
for championing citizens’ participation in the budgeting process. We investigate participation 
in budgeting in a broader perspective: participation within the local council and its wider 
                                                 
1
 We define “participatory budgting” in wider sense. This does not only incude citizen participation but 
also engagements of elected members and local council officials in budgeting (Oh and Lim, 2016; Uddin et al., 
2011). 
2
 Our intention is not to assess or generalise the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of PB in Japan. 
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stakeholder engagements including citizen and elected representatives. Analytically, the 
paper examines how cultural conditions of Japan interact with the PB process.  
The next section provides a brief review of local government budgeting and 
participation, followed by an introduction to a theoretical framework and the research method 
section. Empirical findings are then presented and set in the context of the cultural norms of 
Japanese society. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
Participatory budgeting and cultural perspectives 
In Western democracies, PB is envisaged as a tool through which to articulate a deliberative 
or participative form of democracy in which stakeholders have opportunities to engage in 
local authority decision-making processes3 (Ariely, 2013). The extent of the ‘success’ or 
‘failure’ of stakeholder engagements with local government budgeting is discussed in prior 
work. For instance, Baiocchi and Lerner (2007) discuss the success of PB in balancing 
resource allocation in some ethinically-diverse Canadian local communities.  Similarly, PB in 
Ichikawa, Japan, has been credited with supporting non-profit projects on which citizens vote 
through the injection of one percent of residential tax revenues to those projects (Sintomer et 
al., 2012).  
Most of the current studies on PB are however critical of wider stakeholder 
engagements reporting various unintended consequences: undermining the level of trust 
between politicians and citizens (Im et al., 2014); low and unrepresentative participation 
(Ebdon and Franklin, 2006); domination of technocrats (Gusmano, 2013); and of being 
merely a legitimacy tool, with no direct consequences for the final budget (Bräutigam, 2004). 
Studies have also cited economic and institutional impediments such as poor budgetary 
allocations for citizens and economic austerity discouraging the engagement of wider 
stakeholders in the PB process (Rossmann and Shanahan, 2011; Cepiku et al., 2016).   
Whilst economic and institutional reasons are important, cultural variables are also 
critical in shaping wider stakeholder engagements, including citizens (or lack thereof) in the 
PB process (van Helden and Uddin, 2016). Culture has long been considered in the New 
Public Management (NPM) literature to be a key determinant of the process, consequences 
and outcomes of reforms (Christensen et al., 2007). Different cultural frameworks, for 
instance Hofstede (Pillay, 2008; Kim, 2017), Grid-group culture (Simmons, 2016) and 
Douglasian theory (Linsley et al., 2016), amongst others, have been drawn on to explain 
                                                 
3
 PB originated in Porto Alegre in Brazil, later adapted and mobilised by development agencies and 
Western governments (Uddin et al., 2011) 
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national cultures and associate them with local government reforms such as NPM. For 
instance, studies on local government reforms in Japan have discussed the Japanese cultural 
context in relation to the adoption of Western-centric administration and local government 
reforms (Norton, 2007; Jun and Muto, 1995). It is argued that the culture of collectivism has 
been a positive force in making successful reforms in the public sector of Japan (Eshima et 
al., 2001; Christensen, 2000). 
Nevertheless, cultural perspectives of the PB processes are relatively under-
researched despite the calls for studying culture in public engagements (Flynn, 1998). Irvin 
and Stansbury (2004) have argued that low and unrepresentative participation in the budget 
process may be indicative of a local culture characterised by citizens’ undisputed acceptance 
of decisions undertaken by politicians. In a similar vein, some Japanese studies have reported 
challenges in getting individuals involved in the PB process (Fukushima, 2014; Nakatani, 
2013). Building on the above literature, this paper draws on Nakane’s (1970) work4 to offer 
some understanding of the challenges of PB processes in Japanese local government.  
 
Vertical society – the Japanese way 
Nakane’s main focus was to understand Japanese society by examining the Japanese 
individual, group formation, and the relationships between group and individual and between 
groups. These relationships have serious implications on how participation occurs at the level 
of organisation and beyond. We have also employed recent studies on Japanese culture and 
society (Abe, 1995; Yamamoto, 1983; Kokami, 2009; Benedict, 1988; Curtis, 1999; Norton, 
2007; Jun and Muto, 1995; van Wolferen, 1989) to complement Nakane’s work.  
Nakane (1970) employed the concepts of “frame” (“ba” in Japanese) and “attribute” 
to capture how individuals see themselves in a group and in society at large. Frame indicates 
a location or belongingness, while attribute indicates profession or position. Identifying with 
a particular frame – a company, family or group, in other words, a collective – is considered 
to be the primary means of introduction. Social grouping in Japan is often constructed on the 
basis of a frame of group members (work place, village, etc.) with differing attributes. In 
order to sustain the group, coherence is crucial (Benedict, 1988). In Nakane’s view, this is 
done in two ways: by influencing members with a feeling of oneness or unity, and/or by 
creating an internal structure which ties individuals in the group to each other and thus 
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 Other cultural frameworks could have provided different insights but we opted for Nakane’s work 
mainly because it is entirely focused on understanding Japanese society in relation to other societies. This is also 
complemented by most recent cultural works on Japan. 
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strengthens the internal structure of the group. In practice, these two modes occur, are bound 
together and progress together. This is further elaborated upon below. 
In order for members to have a feeling of oneness or unity with the group, people with 
different attributes are led to feel that they are members of the same group consciousness of 
“us”. Japanese emotional investment in groups is manifested in the way they speak about 
their groups. Oneness is frequently expressed – “our company”, “us” – in everyday private 
and public conversations. As Nakane (1970: 4) puts it: “… latent group consciousness in 
Japanese society is expressed in the traditional and ubiquitous concept of ie, the household, a 
concept which penetrates every nook and cranny of Japanese society”. The Japanese usage 
uchi-no referring to one’s workplace indeed derives from the concept ie. The term ie also has 
implications beyond those to be found in the English words of household or family. 
“Oneness” is also strengthened by differentiating the group from other groups/frames (“us” 
versus “them”). Hence, there is often fierce rivalry and hostility towards other groups. The 
entire society is composed of numerous competing but independent groups. This rivalry and 
competition between groups and organisations is also reflected in the public sector literature 
(Christensen, 2000).  
The internal structuring of the group is very important for group coherence and 
survival (Aoki, 1988). In general, groups share a common structure; an internal organisation 
by which the members are tied vertically into a delicately graded order (Nakane, 1970: 39). A 
vertical relationship emphasises differences between members, or develops a very delicate 
and intricate system of ranking within it (Jun and Muto, 1995). In vertical group formation, 
three categories of relationship are found to exist: sempai (seniors), kohai (juniors) and doryo 
(equal). These differentiations are clear, they are expressed both publicly and privately, and 
the order is maintained irrespective of an individual’s status, qualifications, popularity or 
frame (Mizutani et al., 1995). As Nakane (1970: 28) puts it, “there is a deeply ingrained 
reluctance to change the established order. The relative rankings are thus centered on an ego 
and everyone is placed in a relative locus within the firmly established vertical system”. The 
vertical organisation, fixing the ranking of participants from its beginning, is also reflected in 
prior work (Yashiro, 2013; Jun and Muto, 1995).  
The Japanese word seken perhaps expresses more accurately the role of the individual 
in the group, and indeed in Japanese society (Abe, 1995). Being in seken means that all 
members of the group should act cohesively or seken will purge individual differences to 
impose wa (“oneness” or “unity”), without any debate or questions (Kitamura, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the iron clad of seken has been loosing its grips in modern society. Kokami 
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(2009) has termed this kuki, in other words, a loosely coupled seken. Whatever the form 
seken takes, it still contributes to maintaining wa (harmony) within the group. van Wolferen’s 
(1989: 196) comment on Japanese political power reflects this: “Japanese who disagree with 
the way in which the system works and who translate their discontent into political actions 
are considered subversive and looked upon as potential bomb-throwers”.  
In summary, the primacy of group over individuals, and of frame over attributes, 
group rivalries, and a deeply embedded Japanese consciousness of vertical relationships and 
oneness or wa have serious implications for how an organisation works. It is therefore 
interesting to examine how notions such as “participation” are implicated in the everyday 
lives of Japanese organisations. We examine these cultural norms in relation to the 
participation of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians in budgeting in the Kitakyushu case.   
 
Research methods 
Data for this case study were collected in 2014 over a span of one year, including multiple 
visits to the city council and the collection of documents. Important data sources for the 
identification of societal and cultural conditions included a preliminary review of the 
historical literature on Kitakyushu council, as well as the broader politico-economic and 
historical literature, such as analytical commentaries on Japan’s political and economic 
situation and on local government in general. The review was conducted with specific 
reference to identifying the contexts surrounding local government. As a next step, in order to 
develop a better understanding of the structural conditions faced by the key actors in 
Kitakyushu, we collected media reports, annual statements and official documents relating to 
Kitakyushu.  
Semi-structured interviews were one of most important sources of data contributing to 
an understanding of local government budgeting practices. Two authors (one native speaker) 
were involved in facilitating the interviews. In total, we have spoken to 20 key stakeholders 
(in two stages), comprising 1 community leader (user of local government services), 1 ward 
official, 5 assembly members, 10 local government officials, and 1 professor (retired from the 
city government, with experience in the budgetary department). The second round of 
interviews at the local council was based on knowledge acquired from the first round. Two 
interviews were held, with the deputy mayor and a consultant working for local government 
reforms. Most interviews took place in the workplace, while some, especially those with 
politicians, were held in different locations, including one in a café.  
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The interviews were conducted mainly in Japanese, but translated immediately into 
English so that the non-Japanese author could follow them. Most interviews lasted around 60 
minutes and were digitally recorded. Issues discussed during the interviews included: the 
nature of budgeting; the level of participation; the role of departments, politicians (assembly 
members), community members and the general public in influencing budget decisions; and 
the role of central government and civil servants. After completing each interview, the 
authors discussed the interview data and reflected on the findings to prepare themselves for 
the next interview. We presented our initial findings at two seminars attended by Japanese 
and UK local government researchers (60 participants). In addition to the interviews, one 
author attended an assembly meeting and watched assembly meetings on YouTube. 
Having collected the data, the next stage was an analysis of the interviews in two 
forms: uncovering the cultural conditions, and determining the key actors’ understanding of 
the practices. Our main aim was to make sense of the participation of citizens and assembly 
members in the budgeting process. In order to do this, we drew on Nakane’s work on the 
vertical society and identified key themes to interpret the findings and agents’ interpretations 
of budgeting practices. As we interpreted our findings, we constantly reworked our themes to 
capture deeper explanatory nuances of the data and to theorise the process of participation in 
budgeting.  
 
Local government in Japan and Kitakyushu 
Local government units in Japan provide a wide range of services to citizens, covering 
virtually everything except diplomacy, defense, currency and justice. Three fifths of the total 
tax revenues are spent at local government level employing three million people. Japan’s 
local autonomy system has a two-tier system of local government: prefectures and 
municipalities. Prefectures are regional government units, and municipalities are basic local 
government units. The largest city within a municipality is often formally ‘designated’, and 
its power and functions are similar to those of prefectures in core areas such as social welfare, 
public health and urban planning. Kitakyushu, our case study, is a formally ‘designated’ city. 
There are two governance structures at the heart of all local government units: 
legislative and executive. The legislative branch is composed of representatives from local 
communities elected through adult suffrage, and makes decisions on the budget and local 
ordinances. It comprises the mayor or governor, plus assembly members, all of whom are 
directly elected by local residents for four years. The executive branch implements the 
policies decided by the legislative branch. The mayor is the head of both legislative and 
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executive branches. The mayor/governor has the power of veto over the local assembly/city 
council, mirroring the powers of the US presidency.  
[Insert Table One] 
The local government reforms in Japan since 1990 have significantly shaped local 
councils, including Kitakyushu council. In the context of economic decline compounded by 
an ever-increasing elderly population, a restriction of local council’s spending power, cost 
cuts and outsourcing have been common to all councils during the last two decades, including 
Kitakyushu (Tanaka, 2010). The economic decline has been reflected in the Table One. 
Revenue has been decreasing and almost 55 per cent of the total budget is under the local 
government’s discretionary power.  
Further scrutiny reveals that half of the unconditional revenues are in fact committed 
to fixed costs such as personnel, public assistance and the cost of public debt. In theory, the 
remainder is not fixed and may be influenced by stakeholders. The current Mayor, who was 
first elected in December 2006, made direct partcipation agenda one of his political pledges 
in his election campaign for more transparency and accountability in decision-making 
process. In this context, direct citizen participation was initiated in 2008 in Kitakyushu5. 
Given the Mayoral election pledge and the claims of wider stakeholders’ participation in 
Kitakyushu promoted by the local government associations and media, we have sought to 
examine the elements of participation in the budgeting process. The budget cycle comprises 
of three key phases in Kitakyushu. The interaction of key stakeholders including citizens, 
officials and assembly memebrs in each of these phases are discussed below. At the same 
time, the paper draws on Nakane’s cultural framework to provide some explanations of those 
interactions.  
 
Budgetary proposals: vertical negotiation 
The annual budget - a part of a three-tier planning system: strategic, master and 
implementation plans – begins with the Mayor setting the principles for the year. The Mayor 
has overall authority to prioritise or ignore specific policies or projects set in strategic plans. 
The budget desk representing the Mayor does not engage with any active consultation for 
setting out budget principles. This goes further as the interviews revealed. The budget desk 
often changes the allocations to the departments with little or no explanations. Departmental 
interviewees, accepting the power and authority of the budget desk, suggested that it is the 
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 No evidence of pressures from central government or non governmental agencies to adopt the direct 
participtoin intiative. 
9 
 
budget desk’s remit to make final decisions. In preparing the departmental annual budgets, 
especially regarding the inclusion of new capital items, high priority is given to reflect the 
Mayoral election promises. 
 The budget desk has overall responsibility for the budget. For instance, in response to our 
question of whether the Mayor asks them to pursue specific projects and proposals, the 
finance officer in the budget desk responded: He does not need to tell us. We know what he 
wants and we must be prepared for this. Here, direct influence is unnecessary; as Nakane 
(1970) puts it, “junior must know what senior wants and work accordingly”. The embedded 
vertical relationship does not require undue direct intervention.  
Verticality is, in particular, reflected in the way negotiations are unfolded between the 
budget desk and departments. For instance, commenting on the cost-cutting policy, an 
executive director of the budget desk claimed that they do not anticipate much resistance to 
its cost-cutting announcements. The usual practice is to send a letter to each department 
detailing the percentage to be cut, together with the rules and principles of the budget, at the 
beginning of the budget cycle. The budget desk confirmed that there is some negotiation but 
little resistance from departments because they know this has to be done. One official from 
the budget desk said: We negotiate this with the managers, directors and even the chief 
executive of each department and ask them to adhere to the budget policy. If a compromise is 
not reached, it goes up to the deputy mayor in charge of the budget desk. Negotiation begins 
at managerial level and, if unresolved, goes up to director level, followed by head at the 
department level. Ultimately, the deputy mayor’s decision is final. Although there may be 
some discomfort within departments, promoting oneness and maintaining “wa” is much more 
important (Nakane, 1970; Abe, 1995).  
 
Citizen participation: individual and group 
The budget desk compiles budget proposals from departments and opens them up for 
citizens’ comments. We find that a summary of budget proposals from all departments is 
made available on the city’s websites, at the city’s central office and in ward offices. Citizens 
are able to submit their opinions by e-mail, postal mail or fax, or bring them directly to the 
city council or ward office, giving their name and address. Seeking citizen engagments using 
a variety of ways are usual as depicted in the literature (Oh and Kim, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
level of response received from citizens in Kitakyushu is very minimal. For instance, in the 
2014 financial year, out of a population of more than a million in Kitakyushu city, only 71 
people submitted 167 opinions. The number of opinions posted by citizens was even less in 
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previous financial years. The interview with the finance director of the budgetary division 
was quite revealing. His candid reply to our question on participation was: This citizen 
participation is simply a distraction and meaningless. Budgets are made up of a master plan, 
an implementation plan, debates in assembly, and daily negotiations between related 
organisations. Honestly speaking, it is hard for lay people to understand. It is a professional 
task. This interview strikes a chord with the way the council responds to the opinion 
expressed by private citizens. Most of the responses are brief and negative such as “council 
does not agree”. Our study of citizen response, from 2009 to 2014, fails to identify any 
response that has led to any significant changes to the budget. The deputy mayor conceded: I 
try not to rely too much on public opinions, as the policy makers can better reflect the 
situation than the citizens. Officials also commented that they simply do not usually have 
time to engage with the citizens’ opinions. Nevertheless, this process itself provides 
necessary legitimacy to the budget. This was evident in the following statement of a senior 
staff member of the budget desk: These public comment procedures are intended to attract 
citizens’ interest, not to change the budget, so we handle them with much care and answer 
them very carefully. The budget desk has therefore pursued a policy of encouraging citizens 
to express their responses relating to budgetary issues, despite the fact that such voices are 
rarely heard. As argued by some researchers (Bräutigam, 2004; Adams 2004), the political 
participation in the budget process has become merely a legitimacy tool, hardly any direct 
conseuences for the final budget. 
Whilst the budget desk largely ignores private citizen responses, departments engage 
with local groups and associations in various forums before drafting the budget proposals. 
These long-established but informal connections between local communities and local 
government units were operating well before the direct participation began to appear in 
Japan. A director of the general affairs division of the construction department/bureau 
mentioned: We are close to the citizens in several ways and communicate with them through 
comment letters, directly responding to them in public lectures, and organising meetings with 
them. This contact with citizens is not well-publicised but is conducted mainly through 
various associations/groups. The chairman of the federal association stated: The city and 
associations have maintained an intimate relationship. We have frequent meetings with the 
city and the departments and sometimes we are asked about our needs and proposals. Direct 
citizen disengagement is reported in prior studies (Gusmano, 2013; Cepiku et al., 2016), but 
social group/association engagement with the budget is surprising. These local associations 
seem to work as lobby groups and have been successful in influencing budgets on a small 
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scale. The chairman of the federation explained various ways the association can exert subtle 
or direct pressures on the council exploiting their established links with departments. Group-
lobbying for members to the council is understandable from Nakane’s articulations of 
significance of groups/frame in Japanese society.  
 
Political participation: maintaining oneness or “wa” 
The assembly and its members are important vehicles to ensure wider political participation. 
There are 61 assembly members who work full-time for the assembly, selected from six 
wards for a term of four years. The local assembly process comprises three steps in 
Kitakyushu. First, at a general meeting, the mayor explains his propositions in terms of 
budget bills, closing bills and other ordinances, and assembly members discuss the mayor’s 
propositions in the six permanent committees. Second, three special committees consisting of 
pairs of the permanent committees deliberate on the budget and closing bills. Third, based on 
the deliberations, the assembly decides whether or not to approve the bills in the general 
meeting. We sought to establish to what extent the assembly influences budgetary documents 
and provides checks and balances to mayoral power.  
Legally, the assembly and the Mayor/city council office should stand on an equal 
footing and the assembly is recognised as a guardian, but interviews suggested otherwise. 
Members do not raise awkward questions to the committee or at assembly meetings, as 
commented by the chair of the assembly. The chair defended: It is not our weakness, but the 
Japanese way of problem solving. In our tradition, we do not want to fight, nor do we like 
confrontation. All budget and financial closing bills are passed almost unchanged every year.  
There are also pressures on assembly members not to delay the budget approval 
process. Some assembly members argued that proposing an amendment to the budget would 
not only protract the discussions but would also lead to uncertainty in its execution. One 
assembly member remarked: The convention is that only the positive side of the budget 
should be mentioned during approval meetings and speeches. This is clearly visible from the 
YouTube videos of many assembly meetings.  
Political parties often attempt to shape the budget less publicly. The assembly is seen 
as a formality rather than a debating house. Assembly members discuss the budget within 
their parties and groups. During such discussions, concerns are often raised about the 
inadequacy of the policies and the budget. However, such voices are seldom heard during the 
assembly’s budget meetings. On behalf of the political party that they represent, they 
negotiate with the Mayor’s party rather than the Mayor, and indirectly persuade the latter to 
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consider their budget proposals in exchange for political or election support. There is no 
guarantee that such institutional proposals will receive the Mayor’s approval. The political 
groups accept the Mayor’s decisions but keep on pushing their party’s proposals for the next 
year. This acceptance of Mayoral power can perhaps be explained by Nakane’s reflections on 
how state power is organised in the context of hostile political groupings: Once the state’s 
administrative authority is accepted, it can be transmitted without obstruction down the 
vertical line of a group’s internal organisation. In this way the administrative web is woven 
more thoroughly into Japanese society than perhaps any other in the world (Nakane 1970: 
102). 
Knowing that it is difficult to influence the budget through the assembly, assembly 
members often work in lobby groups and visit the city council office prior to the budget 
proposals from the departments. Members commented that there are also regulatory 
restrictions in place to inhibit true engagement. For instance, the budget bill has to be voted 
with a blanket “yes” or “no”, with no opportunity for partial agreement or disagreement with 
budget items. There is also no opportunity for members to scrutinise individual items, as most 
members follow the party line and find it uncomfortable to go against the party to disagree 
publicly with bills. 
Despite mentioning some regulatory loopholes, assembly members argued that they 
find it difficult to raise any substantial issues in public or in assembly because “this is not the 
Japanese way”. This is not only because the mayor has full political support from the leaders 
of other political parties, but also because assembly members find it difficult to gainsay the 
political arrangements, especially against their own political group. This may be true to some 
extent in every cultural context, but the extent to which resentment or differences are shown 
here is particularly low. Fear of being a disruptive individual within the Japanese seken 
(society), or fear of being purged from the seken, contributes to their inability to raise 
concerns publicly (Kitamura, 2013; Abe, 1995). 
We argue that the internal organisational structure of the political parties, the primacy 
of groups over individuals, and the maintenance of oneness inhibit assembly members from 
debating in the assembly. One of the assembly member interviewees – who was only a 
representative from her party to the assembly – was free to raise issues but found no support. 
Although other assembly members privately supported her, publicly they remained silent. 
She understood the predicament that these assembly members face when it comes to raising 
issues not supported by the party.  
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The nature of political participation (or lack thereof) is understandable if we see it in 
terms of Nakane’s (1970) understanding of Japanese society. The Mayor is seen as the leader, 
and public disagreement in the assembly is not seen as good practice. In contrast, it is much 
easier to maintain oneness and vertical relationships by influencing the mayor’s budget 
through council offices. Most assembly members are keen to maintain the political group’s 
position, and strong group consciousness plays a pivotal role. There is no need for the 
whipping system of Western democracy. Members of a political group almost inevitably go 
along with the political position unless they resign from political parties. The impossibility of 
raising issues close to their hearts leads them to lobbying council offices before the budget 
proposal to the assembly.  
 
Concluding remarks 
To sum up, three key stakeholders - assembly members, officials and citizens – have varying 
degree of participation in the budget process. First, like many other cases in Japan, (JMRC, 
2012; Sintomer et al., 2012; Nakatani, 2013) and Western countries (Ebdon and Franklin, 
2006;), direct citizen participation has been limited and challenging. Nevertheless, we find 
local groups and associations do have some influence or some form of engagement with 
budgeting. Second, we also find that engagement between departments and the budget desk is 
vertically constituted. The budget desk, representing the Mayor, remains the powerful 
element of the budgetary process. Third, the assembly works as an official rubber stamp 
rather than presenting a counter-power to the Mayor. Assembly members work as lobbyists to 
influence the budget less publicly. 
We have sought to understand how participation agendas interact with the Japanese 
way of doing things. Although the influence of cultural norms such as “being in seken” is 
waning in the Japanese society, the primacy of group over inividual is still manifested in the 
everyday lives of people (Norton, 2007; Christensen, 2000). We therefore argue that 
Nakane’s claims about vertical relationships in groups/organisations, maintaining or 
performing “wa” or oneness in the group, and the primacy of groups over individuals are 
useful in shedding light on the nature of participation. For instance, negotiations following 
hierarchy are an interesting example of superior (sempai) versus junior (kohai). Subordinates 
of the mayor and his offices working for the Mayor and trying to take on projects anticipating 
his wishes also reveal a classic case of vertical relationships – a form of internal 
organisational structure within the groups. The importance of maintaining social order 
through “wa” or oneness is reflected in the monologues of assembly meetings. Traditional 
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engagement between departments and citizens is much more effective and still continues, 
even though public comments through websites are encouraged. Traditional department 
engagement with local leaders and associations allows for vertical relationships and group 
characteristics. We do not wish to claim all Japanese local government budgeting emanates 
exactly the same feature of verticality but the general patterns of interactions between and 
among key stakeholders in relation to budgeting process would perhaps be shaped by some 
form of verticality6.  
This paper contributes to the public administration literature in several ways. First, the 
paper provides deeper explanations of how local cultural conditions interact with the PB 
process in general and in Japan in particular. In so doing, the paper contributes to the cultural 
studies on local government reforms and their implementations (Flynn, 1998; Kim 2017; 
Simmons, 2016; Linsley et al., 2016; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). This paper, in particular, 
drawing on Nakane’s work, has demonstrated how the prevailing local cultrural conditions 
give rise to a unique form of participation in the local government budgeting process.  
Without denying the impact of economic crises, regulatory loopholes and institutional 
contexts (Barbera et al., 2016), the paper argues that local cultural norms in Japan do not 
match the conditions required for wider citizen or political participation in the assembly. 
Instead, departmental engagement with local associations and community leaders, and 
assembly members lobbying away from the wider public eye are consistent with local 
cultural conditions. 
Second, the paper offers a critique of unquestioning assumptions about the transfer of 
knowledge such as PB from one context to another and contributes to the wider debate on 
PB.  We concur with the arguments that reforms may have unexpected consequences; cultural 
variations being an important variable (Christensen and Fan, 2016; Masujima, 2005). 
Researchers have already highlighted such risks ( Andrews and de Vries, 2007), warning that, 
countries often do not have the necessary structural (material and cultural) conditions for 
intended participation. It might be argued that, in Japan, material conditions necessitating 
reforms should be similar to Asian nations. However, cultural conditions influencing reforms 
(be they are NPM or PB) are unique, not just to each country, but also to individual 
organisations within a single country (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Appreciation of these 
unique cultural conditions is key to a better understanding and theorising of unintended 
                                                 
6Peculiarities of individual cases will have some implications. For instance, Kitakyushu’s long history 
of military connections may have played a role in strengthening the verticality and hierarchies in the PB process 
(Tamura, 2016). 
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consequences of local government reforms across countries. Thus, this paper suggests caution 
should be exercised in the wholesale adoption of such programmes.  
Finally, we would call for further studies to detail the role of budgetray participation 
efforts in other Japanese local governments, as well as in different cultural contexts. Such a 
study of budget participation in other Japanese local governments may provide further 
insights into the verticality and its perpetuation at the time when the country is experiencing a 
flux in its socio-econiomic conditions (Norton, 2007; Christensen, 2000). Cross-country 
research on budgetary participation should perhaps also be encouraged to shed light on the 
narrowness of local government refroms around the world, demonstrate cultural variations 
and raise cautions of unquestioning adoption of globlised reform ideas.   
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